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Pass in Review: Due Process and 
Judicial Scrutiny of Classification 
Decisions of the Selective 
Service System 
The United States is moving quietly but steadily towards reinsti- 
tuting the draft. Since the Selective Service System's induction author- 
ity expired in 1973,' various military and civilian leaders have declared 
the need to return to compulsory service.2 Registration of eligible 
young men was resumed in July 1980,3 and two bills are pending in 
Congress to restore the President's authority to order inductions.4 De- 
spite the fact that President Carter did not press for the immediate re- 
sumption of the draft5 and President Reagan expressed disinclination 
to reinstitute it,6 the nation is clearly moving towards its reinstatement. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., 1966, Yale University; J.D., 
1969, Columbia University. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editing assistance of Cynthia 
Anne Pope. 
1. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1976). 
2. See, e.g., BillIntroducedin Senate to Reda te  the DraJ, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1981, 
§ 2, at 7, col. 2; Halloran, Navy Chi& Reversizg Stand, Supports Draft Sppling with Carter, 
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1980, at 15, col. 1; Stennk Says It Is Time to Reimpose the DraJ, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 11, 1979, at 56, col. 3; Amy Is Dkturbed By R e e d  Quality, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
11, 1977, at 9, col. 1; No Rush to fill the Ranks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1973, 8 4, at 4, col. 3. 
3. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). Registration had been sus- 
pended in 1975 by President Ford. Proclamation No. 436440 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975). 
Senator Hatfield refused to view the resumption as an empty gesture. "The mood of the 
country had to be tested. . . . The first critical step toward resurrection of the full draft is 
now complete." Hatfield, Draft Regktratiox Simnple Prudence or a Dangerous Sign of 
Desperation?, 17 W I L L A M ~ E  L.J. 1, 10 (1980). 
4. S. 756, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. RE. S2486 (daily ed. March 23, 1981); 
H.R. 1210, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H175 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1981). 
5. See Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, rf the Draft Is Resumed Issues for a New Selective S e ~ i c e h w ,  36 RECORD A.B. 
CITY N.Y. 98, 99 (1981). 
6. Raines, Reagan Vows US. EllPress EDrt to BuildDefenses, N.Y. Times, May 28, 
1981, at 1, wl. 6; Draft 0ficiaZ.s Awaiting Deckion From Reagan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, 
at 28, col. 5; Reagan, Anderson Dkagree on Many Issues But Treat Carter L@ht&, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 22, 1980, 8 1, at 1, col. 5. 
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Conscription has been a political and legal issue in the United 
States since the 1700 '~ .~  The constitutionality of conscription was set- 
tled by the Supreme Court during the First World War.8 Since then, 
the courts have attempted to strike a balance between the government's 
interest in compelling military service and the citizen's interest in re- 
sisting it. 
This Article traces the development of judicial review of adminis- 
trative decisions in the conscription process. After briefly reviewing the 
history of conscription in the United States, the Article examines three 
periods in which standards of review were developed. During the first 
period, from the Civil War to the end of the Second World War, judi- 
cial inquiry was restricted primarily to the question whether the regis- 
trant's local board was acting in excess of its conferred jurisdiction. 
This restriction was formulated by the lower federal courts; throughout 
this period the Supreme Court did not address the issue of the scope of 
review. During the second period, from the end of the Second World 
War to the late 19603, two new standards of review were promulgated: 
a local board was held to lack jurisdiction either if its classification ac- 
tion had "no basis in fact,"g or if it was grounded on multiple bases and 
at least one of these bases was legally insufficient.1° During the third 
period, beginning in 1969, the courts began to require that the Selective 
Service System state reasons for its denial of a registrant's deferment 
request." The result was a more searching examination of the deci- 
sions of local boards and, correspondingly, a lowering of the conviction 
rate of those charged with selective service offenses.I2 Although basis 
7. See notes 18-20 & accompanying text infra. 
8. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
9. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). Technically, the courts reviewed 
the decisions of appeal boards, not of local boards. See Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 
59 (1960); United States v. Crownfield, 439 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Deere, 
428 F.2d 11 19 (2d Cir. 1970). After 1971, appeals boards were required to give reasons for 
Selective Service classifications in some cases. See 50 U.S.C. app. 5 471(b)(4) (1976). Before 
197 1, they did not express reasons for their decisions. A local board occasionally did express 
reasons, however, and the appeal board reviewed such a decision. See notes 78-1 12 & ac- 
companying text infrra. If the appeal board was silent, and it usually was, the courts consist- 
ently held that they would consider that the appeal board had adopted all of the reasons 
suggested by lower levels in the selective service process. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 
403 U.S. 698 (1971); United States v. Atherton, 430 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. 
French, 429 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1970); Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 
1954); United States v. O'Rourke, 341 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The cases, however, 
uniformly speak in terms of review of local board decisions. 
10. See notes 78-125 & accompanying text infra. 
11. See notes 126-72 & accompanying text infra. 
12. For example, in fiscal 1966, there were 516 prosecutions. Of these, 371, or 72%, 
resulted in conviction. In fiscal 1968, of 1,192 prosecutions, 784, or 68%, resulted in convic- 
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in fact remains the standard of review, it operates today differently 
from the manner contemplated when it was announced in 1946. 
The Article suggests a better basis for retaining the requirement 
that the Selective Service System state reasons for its denial of a regis- 
trant's deferment reguest than the two reasons most often stated: facili- 
tation of administrative decisions13 and of judicial review.14 The 
Selective Service System determines whether a person shall be required 
involuntarily to serve two years in the military, possibly at the risk of 
life and limb.15 Certainly those deprivations are as real and as severe 
as any to which the due process clause is addressed.16 The Article con- 
cludes that due process, not administrative or judicial convenience, 
should be held to require that the Selective Service System justify its 
decisions, which may affect registrants' lives and which do affect their 
liberty. 
The Development of Conscription in the United States 
Federal conscription in the United States has had a brief history.17 
During the Revolution, there was no draft; moreover, there was wide- 
spread feeling before that war that a national standing army posed an 
unacceptable threat to liberty.'* George Washington suggested a draft 
on at least three occasions during the Revolution,l9 but the Continental 
Congress never obliged him. Instead, the states were permitted to im- 
pose a draft if necessary to fill their militias, which were then requisi- 
tioned by the national government.Z0 
tion. By 1970, prosecutions had risen to 2,833, but only 1,027, or 36%, resulted in conviction, 
and in 1972, of 4,906 prosecutions, a mere 1,642, or 33%, resulted in conviction. [July-De- 
cember 19721 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF SE- 
L E C ~ ~ V E  SERVICE 46. 
13. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird, 453 F.2d 625, 634 (3d Cu. 1971). 
14. See, eg, id.; United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir. 1970) (en 
banc). 
15. Moreover, service in the armed forces inevitably connotes loss or curtailment of 
sigaificant constitutional liberties. 'While members of the military community enjoy many 
of the same rights and bear many of the same burdens as do members of the civilian com- 
munity, within the military community there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in 
the larger civilian community." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974). Thus, the Court 
held that servicemen do not enjoy, for example, the same range of first amendment freedoms 
as do civilians. Id. at 758. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
17. Before the ratification of the Constitution, conscription by the states was common. 
See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1918). 
18. Friedman, Comcr@tion andthe Constitution, 67 MCH. L. REV. 1493, 1507 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Friedman]. 
19. Id.at 1508. 
20. Id. 
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The first federal attempt to institute conscription occurred during 
the War of 1812.21 The bill was not well received by Congress,22 and 
was never enacted.23 
During the Civil War, a statute was enacted that permitted the 
national government to compel its citizens to render military service.z4 
The public's reaction was unambiguous; riots protesting conscription 
occurred throughout the country.25 Reaction to the draft was not lim- 
ited to individuals or unorganized groups; some state and local govern- 
ments also resisted the conscription act.26 The Civil War draft, 
however, was a short-lived experiment; it did not continue even to the 
21. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 384-85 (1918). 
22. The bill provoked sharp responses from members of Congress. For example, 
speaking in the House of Representatives on December 9, 1814, Daniel Webster attacked the 
notion of a compulsory draft: "The question is nothing less than whether the most essential 
rights of personal liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in the worst 
form. . . . The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled. The people of this country have not 
established for themselves such a fabric of despotism. They have not purchased at a vast 
expense of their own treasure and their own blood a Magna Charta to be slaves." 14 THE 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 57 (1903). 
23. Commentators have not agreed upon why the bill failed. Chief Justice White, writ- 
ing for the Court in Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), briefly reviewed the history 
of conscription in the United States and concluded that the Monroe Plan, named after then 
Secretary of War James Monroe, was never adopted because "[pleace came before the bill 
was enacted." Id. at 385. Thus, the Chief Justice may have been implying that the bill 
otherwise would have passed. See also R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
ARMY 126 (1967). Professor Friedman disagrees with this interpretation. "[Tlhe Court 
blithely dismissed the most significant aspect of the Monroe Plan: not the fact that it was 
introdked, but the fact that-congress never passed the proposal because a substantial 
number of congressmen did not believe that the federal government had the power to con- 
script." Friedman, supra note 18, at 1541. 
24. Civil War Enrollment Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863); See R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 208 (1967). Professor Friedman notes, however, that there is 
no agreement over whether the Act was a genuine conscription bill or merely a channeling 
device to encourage the rich to pay the poor to serve for them. Friedman, supra note 18, at 
1544. One commentator suggests that only 6% of the Union Army was procured through 
conscription, rather than by commutation-payment of a sum of money in lieu of service- 
or substitution-securing another person to serve the draftee's term. R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 210, 357 (1967). 
25. Professor Friedman observed, 'The largest disturbance, which took place in New 
York City, resulted in an estimated 1,200 deaths and millions of dollars in property damage. 
Fifteen regiments of regular troops were eventually required before the pillaging mobs could 
be subdued." Friedman, supra note 18, at 1545. 
26. See id. Resistance by states or municipalities is not just a phenomenon of the dis- 
tant past. During the United States' involvement in Viet Nam, the Massachusetts legislature 
enacted a bill requiring the state attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of the 
war by an original action in the United States Supreme Court if possible. The Court refused 
to accept the ensuing complaint, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), and Massa- 
chusetts thereupon commenced an action in the district court. The First Circuit a f h n e d  the 
district court's dismissal of the action. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). 
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end of the 
After the end of the draft in April 1865, conscription was not again 
a serious issue until the First World War. Shortly before the United 
States declared war, a bill was introduced to establish the draft and, 
despite oppo~ition,~~ was promptly enacted.29 At this time, the 
Supreme Court undertook its only examination of the constitutionality 
of conscription in Arver v. United Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Chief Justice White upheld the statute against a constitutional 
attack based both upon article I3l and the thirteenth amendment.32 
The constitutional question has not again reached the Supreme 
although inferior federal courts occasionally have reviewed 
the draft and echoed Ar~er .~4 
The draft did not reappear until September 1940.35 This draft was 
the first in United States history to be established during peacetime; 
although the war in Europe had begun, the United States was at peace. 
27. Friedman, supra note 18, at 1546. 
28. Id. at 1550. 
29. Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (expired 1919). 
30. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Years earlier, the Pe~sylvania Supreme Court had upheld 
the constitutionality of the Civil War draft. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863). For a 
discussion of the constitutionality of the draft, see Friedman, supra note 18. The only devel- 
opment in this area since 1969 has been the recent challenge to the all-male draft, which 
does not challenge the concept of conscription itself. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 
(1981). 
31. The Court focused upon the war power, U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 11, and the 
"power to raise and support armies," U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 12, as the sources of author- 
ity which, together with the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. IS, 
implied the propriety of conscription. The Chief Justice replied to arguments that this anal- 
ysis read too much into the Constitution: "[IJt is said, the right to provide is not denied by 
calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact 
enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all 
power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only 
be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power." 
245 U.S. at 377-78. Professor Friedman has attacked this technique of implying powers in 
the national government. Friedman, supra note 18, at 1498. 
32. The thirteenth amendment argument was disposed of in a single paragraph. "Fi- 
nally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by govemment from the 
citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of 
the rights and honor of the nation as the result of a war declared by the great representative ' 
body of the people can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of 
the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the 
contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement." 245 U.S. at 390. 
33. It was, however, mentioned by the Court as a settled issue in Billings v. Truesdell, 
321 U.S. 542, 556 (1944), and in United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 9 (1953). 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 450 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1971); O ' C o ~ o r  v. 
United States, 415 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1969) (upholding constitutionality of provision requir- 
ing alternate civilian work), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 968 (1970). 
35. Selective Training and Seece  Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (expired 1945). 
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Introduction of the bill evoked serious debate in C0ngress;3~ the bill 
passed, however, and the Act continued to provide draftees until its 
expiration on May 15, 1945.37 
Only three years later, Congress passed the Selective Service Act 
of 1948,38 which provided for conscription of every able-bodied male 
sometime between his eighteenth and twenty-sixth birthdays.39 Thus, 
after 172 years, the nation seemed to embrace a permanent commit- 
ment to a peacetime draft.40 This commitment was continued with the 
passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act4' and the 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967,42 which were major revisions of 
the 1948 Act. 
Although by 1967 the nation was deeply involved in Viet Nam, 
technically it was still at peace. Opposition to the de facto war and the 
draft grew, however, as manifested by more frequent demonstrations 
and litigation.43 Judicial recognition of the Selective Service System's 
faults also became more frequent.44 In part because of the judiciary's 
increased sensitivity to problems created by the draft, Congress again 
revised the operation of the Selective Service System in 1971.45 The 
draft continued, but with greatly improved protection for the regis- 
trant's rights46 and concomitant restrictions on the Selective Service, 
36. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1552. 
37. Ch. 720, 3 16@), 54 Stat. 885, 897 (1940). 
38. Ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. $5 451-473 (1976)). 
39. Ch. 625, 5 4, 62 Stat. 604, 605-07 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. 5 454 
(1976)). 
40. The only internal limitation in the 1948 Act was the date of expiration of the au- 
thority for inductions. Ch. 625, 5 17, 62 Stat. 604, 625 (1948). As that date approached, 
however, Congress extended it, and continued to do so successively into the 1960's. Ch. 445, 
5 1, 64 Stat. 318 (1950); ch. 144, tit. I, 8 l(w), 65 Stat. 75, 87 (1951); ch. 250, tit. I, 5 102, 69 
Stat. 223,224 (1955); Pub. L. No. 86-4, § 1,73 Stat. 13 (1959); Pub. L. No. 88-2, 5 1, 77 Stat. 
4 (1963). At the same time, registration and classification continued for every male between 
the ages of 18 and 26. 
41. Ch. 144, 65 Stat. 75 (1951) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. $5 451-473 (1976)). 
42. Pub. L. No. 90-40,81 Stat. 100 (1967) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. $5 451-473 
(1976)). 
43. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); United States v. Bemgan, 
283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), a f d ,  417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir.), cerf. denied, 397 U.S. 909 
(1969); [July-December 19721 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 46. 
44. See, e.g., Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 
quoted in note 127 infra. 
45. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, tit. I, 85 Stat. 348 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. $5 45 1-473 (1976)). 
46. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. 5 471a (1976). See notes 159-62 & accompanying text 
inpa. 
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whose operations had been largely unregulated.47 
The impending withdrawal of United States forces from Viet Nam 
led Congress to permit the draft to expire on June 30, 1973.48 Despite 
occasionil indications from the military that it wished to have induc- 
tions resumed,49 not until 1980 was a serious effort begun to revive the 
Selective Service System by reinstituting registration.50 Thus, the draft 
has existed for only thirty-three years, more than three-quarters of that 
period in peacetime. 
Judicial Review Before 1946 
Review Before the Second World War 
Prior to the Second World War, judicial challenges to the draft 
were rare. Judicial review was available during the Civil War only by 
writ of habeas corpus, which was limited to cases in which the conscrip- 
tion authority had been illegally exercised.51 Challenges focused on 
local board actions that were entirely without authority because they 
exceeded conferred jurisdicti~n.~~ 
During the First World War, judicial review continued to be avail- 
able only by writ of habeas c0rpus.~3 Although the procedural mecha- 
nism remained the same, the scope of review had been expanded. In 
Angelus v. S~IZivan,'~ the court noted that draft board decisions could 
47. See notes 126-72 & accompanying text infra. 
48. See 50 U.S.C. app. 8 467(c) (1976). 
49. See note 1 supra. 
50. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). The reinstitution of registra- 
tion met some resistance. See, e.8, Draft Foes Protest Regirtration, N.Y. Times, July 29, 
1980, 8 11, at 7, coL 2; Capital Protest Lv Planned Over Registration for Draft, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 15, 1980, at 16, col. 6; Kaiser, Carnpm Rallies Across US. Protest Regirtration Plan, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1980, at 16, col. 3. 
51. See, e.g., Stingle's Case, 23 F. Cas. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 13,458);in re Irons, 13 
F. Cas. 98 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 7066). 
52. Seein re Irons, 13 F. Cas. 98, 99 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863). 
53. One of the reasons for this limited review involved the structure of the draft. 
Under the Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15,g 2,40 Stat. 76,78 (expired 1919), issuance of 
the induction order immediately conferred jurisdiction over the registrant upon the military, 
subjecting the registrant to military law. See Franke v. Murray, 248 F. 865, 868 (8th Cir. 
1918); United States ex rel. Helmecke v. Rice, 281 F. 326, 329 (S.D. Tex. 1922); see also 
Estep v. United States, 237 U.S. 114, 124 n.17 (1946); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542,546 
(1944). Violations of orders were then prosecuted by court-martial, not by criminal trial in 
the civilian courts. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 132 n.1 (1946) (Murphy, J., 
concurring). 
54. 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917). In Angelus, a professed subject of Austro-Hungary, served 
with a conscription order, claimed that he was exempt because of his status as an alien. The 
local and appeal boards in New York City denied his application for exemption, whereupon 
he filed for injunctive relief in the district court. The district court dismissed his challenge 
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be reversed if "their proceedings have been without or in excess of their 
jurisdiction, or have~~been so manifestly unfair as to prevent a fair in- 
vestigation, or . . . there has been a manifest abuse of the discretion 
with which they are invested under the act . . . ."55 Thus, the writ was 
expanded to include matters, such as unfairness and abuse of discre- 
tion, which ordinarily might not enter into .the question of jurisdic- 
tion.56 Angelus thereby recognized three factors, any one of which 
could invalidate an induction order: absence of jurisdiction, unfairness 
of proceedings, and abuse of discretion. 
Later courts more boldly reviewed substantive decisions of the 
draft boards. In Arbitman v. - ~ o o d s i d e , ~ ~  the court echoed the three- 
part inquiry of Angelus and elaborated the abuse of discretion stan- 
dard: "[Ulpon proof that the investigation has not been fair, or that the 
for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found that federal courts did have jurisdiction to 
review conscription orders that allegedly exceeded the Selective Service System's jurisdic- 
tion, id. at 63-64, but affirmed on other grounds. 
55. Id. at 67. 
56. See Franke v. Murray, 248 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1918); Exparte Cohen, 254 F. 71 1 (E.D. 
Va. 1918); United States ex re/. Pascher v. Kinkead, 248 F. 141 (D.N.J. 1918); Exparre Beck, 
245 F .  967 (D. Mont. 1917); United States ex rel. Troiani v. Heyburn, 245 F. 360 (E.D. Pa. 
1917). 
This expansion of the reach of habeas corpus in the context of Selective Service cases 
parallels its expansion in federal review of state criminal convictions. Prior to 1915, habeas 
corpus was available only for a limited inquiry into the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
See Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Exparte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Exparre 
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). "The concept of jurisdiction, however, was subject to 
considerable strain during this period. . . ." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,450 (1963) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). The strain placed on the concept of jurisdiction during this period was made 
manifest by cases that stretched the ordinary concepts of jurisdiction to reach claims that 
otherwise might not have been cognizable. See, e.g., Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) 
(writ held to %e to challenge conviction under unconstitutional statute). 
In 1915, in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), the Court abandoned some of the 
rigidity of the concept of jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the prisoner's opportunity 
to have constitutional claims heard in the state court system. The final expansion of federal 
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), 
unambiguously expanded the writ to reach all errors of constitutional law made in trial or 
appellate proceedings. This change, too, is echoed in Selective Service cases that expanded 
judicial review to reach all errors of law made by the Selective Service System. See notes 
113-22 & accompanying text infra. 
For more extended discussion of the development of federal habeas corpus, see Bator, 
Finaliiry in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
441 (1963); Breman, Federal Habeas Corpus and Slate Prisoners: An Exercke in Federalkm, 
7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Hart, Foreword The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 101-25 (1959). 
57. 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919). The facts ofArbifman were similar to those ofdngelus. 
Arbitman claimed an exemption from conscription because of his resident alien status. The 
district court dismissed his challenge for lack of jurisdiction, but the appellate court re- 
versed, holding that the federal courts did have jurisdiction to grant relief. 
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board has abused its discretion by a finding contrary to all the substan- 
tial evidence, relief should be given by the courts . . . ."58 The 
Arbifman court thus equated abuse of discretion with a board finding 
contrary to substantial evidence. Angelus and Arbiiman in effect 
opened a debate concerning the extent to  which^ the courts could review 
the substantive decisions of the Selective Service System.59 
Review from 1940 to 1946 
During the early 1940's, as in the pre-1919 period, the courts con- 
sidered whether the local board had jurisdiction, whether it had af- 
forded the registrant a fair investigation, and whether it had abused its 
di~cretion.~~ In 1943, however, the Fourth Circuit asserted in Go# v. 
United States61 that an "action [of the board] is to be taken as final, 
notwithstanding errors of fact or law, so long as the board's jurisdiction 
is not transcended and its action is not so arbitrary and unreasonable as 
to amount to a denial of a constitutional right."62 GO# appeared to 
retreat from the Angelus and Arbirman elements of review, because it 
implied that mere unfairness in the proceedings would not invalidate 
an induction order. The Go# court did not explain its pronouncement, 
58. Id. at 442. 
59. Arbifman also foreshadowed another problem of judicial review that became acute 
four decades later. The petitioner had demanded classification as a resident alien who had 
not commenced the naturalization process. He submitted appropriate documentation to his 
local board. The board simply elected not to believe Arbitman's evidence, although it had 
none of its own. This unsupported disbelief was found sufficiently egregious to justify judi- 
cial intervention on the petitioner's behalf. 258 F. at 443. 
As conscientious objector applications proliferated in the later years of the draft, the 
courts were faced with an increasing number denied by the Selective Service System solely 
on the basis of local boards' unsupported disbelief of registrants' submissions. Like the 
Arbifman court, later courts declined to endorse such decisions. See, e.g., Dickinson v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773 
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 
(1960); cf. Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971) (judicial review of conscientious 
objector claims made by active-duty military personnel). 
None of the draft acts prior to 1967 set forth the availability of judicial review, except 
for the repeated statement that the decisions of the local boards were final except for review 
in the selective service appellate process. See Selective Draft Law of 1917, ch. 15, 3 4, 40 
Stat. 76,79-80; Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 3 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885, 
893; Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, 5 10@)(3), 62 Stat. 604, 620. It was left to the 
courts to determine what "hal" meant. Arbitman, an early step in this determination, made 
it clear that finality would not preclude all substantive challenges to the Selective Service 
System's actions. 
60. See, e.g., Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1943) (dictum); Rase v. 
United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942); United States exrel. Ursitti v. Baird, 39 F. Supp. 
872 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). 
61. 135 F.2d 610 (4th Cu. 1943). 
62. I Z a t  612. 
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however, and it was not followed by other courts. The proper scope of 
review thus was unclear, especially because the Supreme Court never 
ruled on the propriety and scope of judicial review of selective service 
decisions under the 1940 
While the courts considered the scope of review, they also wrestled 
with the procedural problem of when to review draft board decisions. 
During the early 1940's, the courts indicated their reluctance to inter- 
fere with the Selective Service System's operation. Although issuance 
of an induction order no longer automatically conferred jurisdiction 
over the registrant in the military courts,64 thus allowing draft resisters 
to be prosecuted in the civilian courts, the courts continued to insist 
that a registrant could obtain review of a classification decision only by 
writ of habeas corpus after induction and not by refusing induction and 
being indicted.65 Thus, if the defendant refused induction, the court 
would review only the board's jurisdiction, and not the broader ques- 
tion whether the local board's actions had been arbitrary or without 
substantial evidence.66 In contrast, in habeas corpus cases the courts 
could and did reverse a board decision if it lacked substantial 
63. See United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain, 144 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 795 (1945). 
64. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1944). 
65. See Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. Rinko, 
147 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cerf. denied, 325 U.S. 851 (1945); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3d 
Cir. 1944). In part, this doctrine may have derived from a practice developed under the 
Selective Draft Act of 1917. Under that Act, there could be no criminal prosecutions in the 
civilian courts for refusal to accept induction, because as soon as an induction order was 
issued, the registrant was under military jurisdiction. See note 53 supra. In the 19403, it 
may have been thought that the registrant challenging his induction should be subject to 
military jurisdiction while the challenge ran its course so that the military effort would not 
be compromised. 
As a practical matter, the procedural differences between challenging an induction or- 
der by habeas corpus and by criminal 'defense are of enormous consequence to the regis- 
trant. If he refuses induction and is indicted, he remains a civilian, prosecuted in the civil 
courts. If he accepts induction and thereafter challenges the order that compelled it, he is 
within the jurisdiction of the military and subject to its orders. Thus, any inductee who 
subsequently challenges his induction order and fails to conform his conduct to military 
standards while his challenge is being adjudicated may be subject to court-martial. See 
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Billings v. 
Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542,556 (1944); Comment, 77ze Selecfive Service Sysfem: An Adminhfra- 
five Obsfacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2123, 2137 (1966). 
66. For example, the court in Fletcher v. United States, 129 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1942), 
never considered the defendant's claim for exemption on the grounds that he was a Jeho- 
vah's Witness minister. He had pursued his claim through all available administrative chan- 
nels and then had refused to submit to induction. At trial, the defendant offered to prove 
that he had not been given a fair hearing by his local board, but the evidence was ruled 
inadmissible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ensuing conviction. 'The trial court was re- 
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evidence.67 
The trend towards restricting judicial review in time as well as in 
scope reached its climax in PaIbo v. United States.68 In a prosecution 
for failure to report for alternative service,69 the defendant argued that 
the local board's rejection of his claim for exemption as a minister was 
arbitrary, biased, and against the weight of the evidence. Although 
Falbo's claim would have been cognizable under the prevailing stan- 
dards of review for habeas corpus applications,70 the Court ruled, in 
effect, that the case was not ripe for judicial intervention. "The narrow 
question. . . presented by this case is whether Congress has authorized 
judicial review of the propriety of a board's classification in a criminal 
prosecution for wilful violation of an order directing a registrant to re- 
port for the last step in the selective process. We think it has not."71 In 
further discussion, the Court made it clear that the defense was rejected 
because the defendant had not exhausted Selective Service System ad- 
ministrative steps remaining after issuance of the induction order.72 
- 
quired to determine only whether the defendant, as a registrant, had been commanded by a 
lawful authority to report for induction, and had knowingly failed to do so." Id. at 263. 
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit was even more emphatic about the unavailability of 
judicial review prior to actual induction. In Biron v. Collins, 145 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1944), 
the court explicitly ruled that the propriety of a registrant's classification could never be 
reviewed in the context of a defense to an indictment. Id. at 759. 
67. See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra. 
68. 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
69. Registrants who claimed and were granted classification as conscientious objectors 
were required to perform two years of civilian service in lieu of induction. Selective Train- 
ing and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (expired 1945). Thus, for 
purposes of judicial review, an order to report for alternative civilian service was analogous 
to an order to report for induction. Falbo had filed as a conscientious objector and as a 
Jehovah's Witness minister. The former claim had been granted; the latter denied. 320 U.S. 
at 550-51. 
70. See notes 54-60 & accompanying text supra. 
71. 320 U.S. at 554. 
72. These included a final physical examination or inspection by the military, which, if 
the registrant failed, rendered him unacceptable for military service and ineligible for induc- 
tion, thus obviating the need for any judicial review of classification decisions. Id. at 553. 
The Court also noted practical reasons for not interfering with the draft. The majority 
was concerned that excessive judicial intrusion might undercut the effort to obtain inductees, 
pointing out that, in Falbo's case, litigation had kept him in court until he had almost be- 
come ineligible because of his age. Id. at 555. The Court interpreted Congress' failure ex- 
plicitly to authorize classiication review in criminal proceedings as an expression of intent 
that there be none. Id. at 554-55. 
Dissenting, Justice Murphy stated that the majority's opinion proved too much, pre- 
cluding review by habeas corpus, which the Court's majority presumably intended to retain. 
Id. at 557. Justice Murphy also urged abandonment of the linal order rule: "Criminal 
punishment for disobedience of an arbitrary and invalid order is objectionable regardless of 
whether the order be interlocutory or linal." Id. at 558. 
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Thus, under FaIbo, a registrant who sought to challenge his induction 
order by disobeying it, believing that in so doing he obtained judicial 
review of an unfavorable classification decision, merely ensured his 
conviction. A classification decision would not be reviewed unless the 
registrant reported for induction. 
PaIbo was the first Supreme Court decision directly addressing the 
availability of judicial review. The Court's disinclination to interfere 
with selective service processing73 was immediately reflected in lower 
court refusals to allow prosecuted registrants to defend on the basis of 
improper classification.74 At the end of the Second World War, there- 
fore, registrants dissatisfied with their classifications faced a substantial 
obstacle to bringing their dissatisfaction to the courts' attention.75 Judi- 
cial review could be obtained only through habeas corpus, not in de- 
fense to a criminal prosecution. A substantive hearing, once obtained, 
was narrowly limited in scope by decisions of the courts of appeals.76 
The result was a severe limitation on a registrant's ability to insist that 
the Selective Service System function in an impartial and reasonable 
73. Id. at 551-52, 554-55. 
74. See, e.g., Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. 
Rinko, 147 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 85 1 (1945); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 
169 (3d Cir. 1944). Seegenerally Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Estep v. United States, 
327 U.S. 114, 138-39 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); Fujii v. United States, 148 F.2d 298 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); Connor & Clarke, JudicialInvestigution of Se- 
lective Service Action, 19 TUL. L. REV. 344 (1945). 
75. Since the beginning of the peacetime draft in 1948, both the deferment structure 
and the administrative procedural structure have remained essentially the same. Defer- 
ments have been made available to those whom the military considered mentally, physi- 
cally, or morally unfit (1-Y and 4-F), students (I-S(C) and 2-S), those engaged in 
occupations essential to national welfare (2-A), those engaged in agriculture (2-C), and those 
whose induction would work an extreme hardship upon their dependents (3-A); exemptions 
or alternate forms of service were available to ministers (4-D) and conscientious objectors 
(I-A-0 and 1-0). See 32 C.F.R. pt. 1622 (1970). Most of these classifications involved the 
draft board in discretionary determinations of the registrant's entitlement to the classifica- 
tion, such as whether the registrant had demonstrated extreme hardship (3-A), whether he 
was sincere in his professed beliefs (I-A-0 and 1-O), or whether he was, in fact, engaged in 
an essential occupation (2-A). Regulations promulgated since the 1971 amendments have 
streamlined the classification structure to some extent by eliminating the 2-A, 2-C, and 1- 
S(C) deferments. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 1622 (1981). Granting or denying a deferment in part 
upon the draft board's subjective evaluation of the registrant's entitlement raised obvious 
possibilities of challenge, both in the administrative process and in the courts. For an excel- 
lent description of the Selective Service System administrative process, see Comment, nie 
Selective Service System: An Adminz3trutive Obsfucle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2123 (1966). 
76. See, e.g., Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1943) (dictum); Rase v. 
United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942); Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 
1919); Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917); United States ex re/. Ursitti v. Baird, 39 
F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). 
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manner.77 Both this problem and the absence of a generally accepted 
standard of the scope of review were not addressed by the Supreme 
Court until after the draft ended. 
Post-War Review Under Estep v. United States 
The Basis-in-Fact Test 
In 1946, the Court in Estq v. United States78 k s t  addressed the 
question of the scope of judicial review available to a Selective Service 
registrant challenging a classification action. The Falbo Court had 
clearly stated that the opportunity to challenge a local board decision 
would remain narrowly circumscribed, but had denied review on pro- 
cedural grounds; thus, it did not address the permissible scope of judi- 
cial review of classifications. 
In Estq, the Court explicitly attributed the result in Palbo to the 
defendant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available to him 
with respect to his induction order.79 Thus, by implication, the Court 
repudiated cases from the lower courts that had interpreted Falbo as 
precluding any judicial review in a criminal proceeding.80 The Estep 
Court stated: 'cPalbo . . . does not preclude such a defense in the pres- 
- 
77. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
78. 327 U.S. 114 (1946). 
79. "In Falbo v. United States . . . [w]e found no provision for judicial review of a 
registrant's classification prior to the time when he had taken all the steps in the selective 
process and had been finally accepted by the armed services. The question in these cases is 
whether there may be judicial review of his classification in a prosecution under 11 where 
he reported for induction, was finally accepted, but refused to submit to induction." Id. at 
115-16 (1946). This statement of the issue should be contrasted with the statement in FaIbo. 
See text accompanying note 71 supra. As the Esfep Court portrayed FaIbo as an exhaustion 
of administrative remedies case, its task in interpreting the finality language of 8 10(a)(2) of 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720,s 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885,893 (expired 
1945), to permit review in some criminal proceedings was considerably easier. See note 53 
supra. 
Years later, the courts faced the question whether they could review Selective Service 
actions before issuance of an induction order. In general, they cannot. See Clark v. 
Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968). In a few unusual instances, however, pre-induction judicial 
review is permitted. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 
233 (1968) @re-induction judicial review allowed when entitlement to statutory deferment 
as a minister was plain, unequivocal, and uncontested, and registrant was punitively reclas- 
sified 1-A for reasons unrelated to his qualifications for deferment); WolfTv. Selective Sew. 
Local Bd. No. 16,372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967) @re-induction review allowed when students 
were reclassified as available for military service only because they participated in antiwar 
demonstrations). See general& Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 7,405 U.S. 365 
(1972); Hunt v. Local Bd. No. 197,438 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1971). 
80. See, eg., Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. 
Rinko, 147 F.2d 1 (7th Cu.), cerf. denied, 325 U.S. 851 (1945); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 
169 (3d Cir. 1944). 
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ent cases. In the FaCbo case the defendant challenged the order of his 
local board before he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Here 
these registrants had pursued their administrative remedies to the end. 
All had been done which could be d~ne . "~ l  In Falbo, review was de- 
nied because the registrant failed to report for service and was not 
physically e~amined.~2 In Estp, the registrants had reported, had 
completed all steps of the administrative process, and had remaining 
only the symbolic step forward; the Court ruled that the administrative 
process had come to an end, and judicial review would be allowed. 
Having decided that FaZbo did not preclude review, the Court ad- 
dressed section 10(a)(2) of the Selective Training and Service Act, 
which provided that in general "[tlhe decisions of such local boards 
shall be final."83 This section had been thought to preclude classifica- 
tion review by the courts in the criminal defense context,84 but the 
Supreme Court, building on the theory of review from earlier, non- 
selective service habeas corpus case~,~s  seemed simultaneously to limit 
the statutory language and to allow an extensive classification review 
by the courts. 
[A local board's] authority to hear and determine all questions of 
deferment or exemption is, as stated in 5 10(a)(2), limited to action 
"within their respective jurisdictions." It is only orders "within their 
respective jurisdictions" that are made final. . . . By § 10(a)(2) the 
81. 327 U.S. at 123. 
82. See note 72 & accompanying text supra. 
83. Ch. 720, 8 10(a)(2), 54 Stat. 885, 893 (expired 1945). 
84. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 138-41 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., con- 
curring). Justice Frankfurter's argument may prove too much. It is difficult to interpret the 
language of 3 10(a)(2) to exclude all judicial review in the criminal context and yet to permit 
it by way of habeas corpus. This is the problem Justice Murphy had pointed out in his 
dissent in Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944). See note 72 supra. Yet to interpret 
the language so broadly would raise the specter of a conflict between 8 10(a)(2) and the 
habeas corpus clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, 8 9, cl. 2. Apparently to avoid 
this conclusion, Justice Frankfurter cited a report of the House Committee on Military Af- 
fairs from January, 1945, that interpreted the Act to prohibit judicial review of classifications 
in the criminal forum while permitting it under habeas corpus. Estep v. United States, 327 
U.S. 114, 140 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
The Estep majority was aware of this possible problem as well, but declined to treat it 
as a constitutional conflict, implicitly construing the Act to permit habeas corpus review. 
The anomaly of refusing judicial review in the criminal proceeding struck the Court. "It has 
been assumed that habeas corpus is available only aAer a registrant has been inducted into 
the armed services. But if we now hold that a registrant could not defend at his trial on the 
ground that the local board had no jurisdiction in the premises, it would seem that the way 
would then be open to him to challenge the jurisdiction of the local board after convictioh 
by habeas corpus. The court would then be sending men to jail today when it was apparent 
that they would have to be released tomorrow." Id. at 123-25 (footnotes omitted). 
85. See note 56 & accompanying text supra. 
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local boards, in hearing and determining claims for deferment or ex- 
emption must act ''under rules and regulations prescribed by the 
President." Those rules limit, as well as define, their jurisdic- 
tion. . . . [Action by a local board outside of those regulations] 
would be lawless and beyond its juri~diction.~~ 
The Court's analysis approved the limitation of review of selective 
service actions to questions of local board jurisdiction, apparently cir- 
cumscribing the ambit of judicial review.87 The Court defined the con- 
cept of jurisdiction broadly, however, giving courts the flexibility to 
review local draft board decisions. After Estep, any direct violation of 
selective service regulations would be subject to judicial review and, as 
Estep made clear, that review could be by habeas corpus after induc- 
tion or by criminal defense after refusal of induction. 
The Court next had to determine when, if ever, a discretionary 
decision was so unsupported that it warranted judicial intervention, 
and it held: "The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached 
only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the 
regi~trant."~g By setting forth this standard, the Court underscored the 
narrowness of the intended review.89 At the same time, it authorized a 
limited substantive review of classification decisions. Thus, a scope of 
review similar to that developed during the First World War in Angelus 
v. SuZZivang0 and Arbitman v. Wood$idegl was retained, although as a 
formal matter judicial inquiry was limited to the jurisdiction question. 
Therefore, three drafts and eighty-three years after conscription 
first appeared in the United States, the Supreme Court finally decided 
the circumstances under which the courts would be permitted to adju- 
86. 327 U.S. at 120-21. 
87. See notes 51-63 & accompanying text supra. 
88. 327 U.S. at 122-23. 
89. The Court noted that this standard of review is the same as that used in deportation 
cases. Id. at 123 11.14. The Court reviewed Congress' declaration that local board decisions 
were find "The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us that 
Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judi- 
cial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the 
evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The 
decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final even though 
they may be erroneous." Id. at 122. 
The basis-in-fact issue is a question of law, not of fact. United States v. Purvis, 403 
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Miller v. United States, 169 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1948). The trial 
judge in a jury case, therefore, would charge the jury that a basis in fact exists or does not 
exist as a matter of law, leaving for the jury only the factual question whether the registrant 
failed to obey the order he was charged with violating. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 456 
F.2d 1297 (9th Ci. 1972); United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1971). 
90. 246 F. 54 (2d Cir. 1917). 
91. 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919). See notes 54-60 & accompanying text -a. 
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dicate the government's claim upon an American's military service. 
The basis-in-fact test developed in Estep remains the standard applied 
in selective service cases92 and in cases involving military refusals to 
grant a discharge.93 The basis-in-fact test, however, has proved diffi- 
cult to apply.94 Basis in fact clearly was a limited standard of review;95 
it was criticized on the grounds that it would permit criminal convic- 
tions without substantial evidence to support them.96 The basis-in-fact 
test's application in trials of selective service indictments however, re- 
mained unclear. 
The Court reached this issue in Diekinson v. Uni tedSta te~.~~ Dick- 
inson had claimed exemption from service as a minister, but his claim 
was denied. He refused induction, and was convicted for his refusal. 
The Court declared that the reviewing court was required to search the 
registrant's record for some affirmative evidence to support the local 
board's denial of the e~empt ion .~~  At the same time, the Court explic- 
itly rejected any broader standard of review, such as a "substantial evi- 
dence" test.99 In Dickinson's case, however, there was no evidence in 
the file countering his claim for deferment; apparently the local board 
simply had not believed him, and the lower courts had endorsed its 
decision. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction. "PN]hen the 
92. The Esfep standard was incorporated into the selective service statute in 1967. Mil- 
itary Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(8), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. 460(b)(3) (1976)). 
93. The standard of judicial review of military decisions denying discharge of members 
of the armed forces has been taken from Eflep. Cases arising under the selective service law 
and other military laws often are used interchangeably as precedents. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 
959 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971). 
94. See, e.g., Barker v. Laird, No. 1276-70, slip op. at 12 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 1971). 
95. One court later characterized it as "the narrowest known to law." Blalock v. 
United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957); accord United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 
472,483 (5th Cir. 1971); Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 915 (5th Cir. 1968), vacatedon 
other grounds, 394 U.S. 3 10 (1969). 
The Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. $5 551-59, 701-06 (1976 & Supp. I11 1979)), was adopted in the same year that 
Estep was decided. The Act provided numerous bases for review of administrative deci- 
sions, including the "substantial evidence" test, all of them broader than the Estep basis-in- 
fact standard. Selective service acts, however, have consistently exempted the Selective 
Service System from the Administrative Procedure Act. Eg., Selective Service Act of 1947, 
ch. 625, 3 13(b), 62 Stat. 604, 623 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. 463@) (1976)); see 
United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1971); Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d 
Cir. 1970). 
96. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 458 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
97. 346 U.S. 389 (1953). 
98. Id. at 396. 
99. Id. 
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uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him 
prima facie within the statutory exemption, dismissal of the claim 
solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary to the 
spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of justice."l00 Although 
the Court did not cite Arbitman v. Woodside,lol its refusal to endorse 
the local board's decisions reflected the reasoning of Arbitman that 
such a classification action was an abuse of discretion.lo2 
The Dickinson decision laid the foundation for a conflict that did 
not ripen for Mteen years: the obligation of the courts to limit their 
review of local board decisions versus the obligation of the local board 
to make clear the reasons for its decision. Justice Jackson dissented in 
Dickinson, stating that the practical effect of the Court's decision was to 
place upon the local boards a burden to build a record, contrary to 
Esrep and the spirit of the Act.lo3 Despite Justice Jackson's expressed 
concern, lower courts did not interpret Dickinson as imposing such a 
burden on the local boards. 
Dickinson exempmed one of the f icult ies of the basis-in-fact 
test enunciated in Estep: the problem of the silent record.104 Two years 
after Dickinson, in Wifmer v. United States,lO5 the Court warned that 
"it is not for the courts to sit as super draft boards, substituting their 
100. Id. at 397. This language and the rationale underlying it are important in part 
because the Court made no effort to cast its decision in the familiar vocabulary of lack of 
jurisdiction of the local board. Dickinrn was not always followed on this point by the lower 
courts. See United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968) (suggesting local 
board's mere statement of disbelief of registrant's sincerity would suffice to satisfy the Es tq  
basis-in-fact test). Other courts, however, have stated that "to sustain the denial of a claim 
on a mere @.re dkit of lack of sincerity . . . would create serious possibilities of abuse." 
United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 884 (1960); see 
also Capobianco v. Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971); Kess- 
ler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1969). Stated more affirmatively, "[i]t seems 
quite evident that mere disbelief is not enough, and that there must be some affirmative 
evidence to support the rejection of the claimed exemption, or something in the record 
which substantially blurs the picture painted by the registrant and casts doubt on his sincer- 
ity or the genuineness of his claim." Batterton v. United States, 260 F.2d 233,237 (8th Cir. 
1958). 
101. 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919). 
102. See notes 57-59 & accompanying text supra. 
103. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting, 
joined by Burton, J. & Minton, J.). The dissent also recognized, but did not attempt to solve, 
the problem inherent in its approach. 'The board, through silence, makes the registrant's 
task of proving lack of jurisdiction next to impossible." Id. at 400. 
104. This aspect of the problem arose regularly in basis-in-fact cases, as the courts strug- 
gled with the burden of evaluating opaque local board decisions. See, e.g., Rosengart v. 
Laird, 449 F.2d 523 (2d Cu. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 908 (1972); Keefer v. United States, 313 
F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1963); Batterton v. United States, 260 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1958). 
105. 348 U.S. 375 (1955). 
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judgments on the weight of the evidence for those of the designated 
agencies."l06 Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the 
Edep basis-in-fact standard, admonishing the lower courts to eschew 
any search for substantial evidence.lo7 
The silent record problem arose because local selective service 
boards, as in Dicfison and Wifmer, rarely stated reasons for their ac- 
tions. In Owens v. Unired Sfates,l08 the Tenth Circuit described the 
process used by the courts when faced with a silent record: "[Wlhere, 
as here, the Board discloses no reasons for the challenged classification 
. . . we will assume the Board relied upon whatever factual basis is 
reflected in the record, if any."log The Owens court thus suggested that 
courts would undertake a broad inquiry in attempting to locate any 
basis for upholding a selective service decision, and at the same time 
approved the narrow scope of review prescribed by Dickinson. 
The technique of review described by the Tenth Circuit, however, 
did not resolve the problem, and invited the judiciary to endorse local 
board decisions blindly. For example, in United States v. Sfefter, lo the 
registrant had presented a prima facie claim for conscientious objector 
status, and his file contained no conflicting evidence. The local board 
stated no reasons for denying the claim. Reversing the district court's 
conviction, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's suggestion that 
it search for any basis in fact to support the board's decision. 
If the objective facts found in the record do not lead us to the factual 
basis, as they do not, the Government asserts that we may assume 
that intangible factors such a [sic] demeanor form such a basis. But 
how can we as a reviewing court know that the Board relied on such 
submicroscopic data if we are not so informed? We are not endowed 
with extrasensory perception. It is like playing the philosopher's 
ame of looking into a dark room for a black cat that is not there. 
b e  refuse to play such a game." 
106. Id. at 380-81. This theme would be repeated by lower courts. See, e.g., Kessler v. 
United States, 406 F.2d 151, 156 (5th Cir. 1969); Riles v. United States, 223 F.2d 786, 788 
(5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Ruppell, 278 F. Supp. 287, 289-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
107. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. at 381 (citing Dickinson v. United States, 346 
U.S. 389, 396 (1953)). 
Although the local board had remained silent about its reasons for denying the claim, 
the Wifmer Court found in the file enough conllicting evidence to conclude that the local 
board had had a basis in fact for doubting the registrant's sincerity. 348 U.S. at 382-83. 
108. 396 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968). 
109. Id. at 542-43. 
110. 445 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 197 1). 
11 1. Id. at 482. As a practical matter, the government's argument would require that all 
Selective Service defendants be convicted except when the local board failed to follow re- 
quired procedures or allinnatively stated illegal reasons for its decisions. Silence would then 
become the best procedure for any local board, and judicial review would, as one court put 
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Thus, as in Diekinson, the S t e m  court refused to assume an unstated 
basis for the board's decision and refused to permit a local board to 
reject a claim without evidence of its insufIiciency.112 
The Problem of Erroneous Bases for Decisions 
Local boards sometimes did state reasons for their decisions. Oc- 
casionally, reasons deficient in law or fact were commingled with valid 
reasons for the local board's decision. The first case of this type to 
reach the Supreme Court was SicureZZa v. United States,ll3 decided in 
1955, in which Sicurella, a Jehovah's Witness, had been refused classill- 
cation as a conscientious objector. In his application, he declared him- 
self a soldier "in the Army of Christ."ll4 The defendant's claim had 
been investigated by the Department of Justice,llS which recommended 
denial of the deferment on the ground that Sicurella was not, as re- 
quired by the statute, "opposed to participation in war in any form."ll6 
The appeal board denied the claim, and upon Sicurella's refusal to sub- 
mit to induction, he was indicted and convicted. 
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that the 
Department of Justice erred when it stated that Sicurella's willingness 
to participate in a theocratic war disqualified him under the statute.117 
The Court noted the possibility that the record contained some proper 
it, "be a meaningless exercise." Barker v. Laird, No. 1276-70, slip op. at 12 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 
1971). 
112. The Sfetfer court ruled that local boards and appeal boards would be required to 
state reasons for rejecting prima facie claims for conscientious objector status. 445 F.2d at 
483. See notes 126-72 & accompanying text hfra. 
113. 348 U.S. 385 (1955). 
114. Id. at 386. 
115. Under the Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 60), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (current 
version at 50 U.S.C. app. 4560) (1976)), claims for conscientious objector status were, after 
decision by the local board, referred by the appeal board to the Department of Justice for 
investigation and hearing. The Department would then make a recommendation to the ap- 
peal board to assist that board's decision. This provision was deleted from 60) in 1967. 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100, 104. 
116. 50 U.S.C. app. 456(j) (1976). This statutory language consistently was interpreted 
by the courts to preclude selective conscientious objection, that is, opposition to particular 
wars but not to all. See, eg., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
117. The Court found the error of law arising in the Selective Service System's misinter- 
pretation of congressional intent in enacting the conscientious objector exemption. 
"[A]lthough the Jehovah's Witnesses may fight in the Armageddon, we are not able to 
stretch our imagination to the point of believing that the yardstick of the Congress includes 
within its measure such spiritual wars between the powers of good and evil where the Jeho- 
vah's Witnesses, if they participate, will do so without wnal weapons. We believe that 
Congress had in mind real shooting wars when it referred to participation in war in any 
form-actual military c o a c t s  between nations of the earth in our time-wars with bombs 
and bullets, tanks, planes and rockets. We believe the reasoning of the Government in de- 
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basis in fact to support the decision, but held that "where it is impossi- 
ble to determine on exactly which grounds the Appeal Board decided, 
the integrity of the Selective Service System demands, at least that the 
Government not recommend illegal grounds."l18 Thus, the Court in- 
corporated into selective service law a principle long recognized in 
criminal law: a conviction based upon some valid and some invalid 
grounds cannot be allowed to stand.llg 
Many cases following SicureZZa also espoused this principle,I2O 
with the result that the application of the basis-in-fact test changed. 
Sicure1.a restricted the court's role in reviewing classification actions. 
If reasons were stated by the board, the reviewing court could no longer 
search the record for a basis in fact, as in Dickinson v. United Sfates,121 
but was instead limited to that part of the record relied upon by the 
board. The review was more critical of local board actions, however, 
because it was more difficult for local boards to state correct reasons 
than to remain silent and permit the court to find some supporting 
rationale. 122 
Thus, although basis in fact remained the test of validity of local 
board classification decisions, its significance changed after SicureZIa. 
nying petitioner's claim is so far removed from any possible congressional intent that it is 
erroneous as a matter of law." 348 U.S. at 391. 
118. Id. at 392. 
119. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in which a general jury 
verdict of guilty followed instructions that there were three possible grounds to support con- 
viction. One of the bases tendered by the trial court to the jury was unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction. "[Ilf any of the clauses in question is invalid 
under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld." Id. at 368. 
Deciding Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971), the Supreme Court traced applica- 
tion of the principle in selective service law to the decision in United States ex re[. Levy v. 
Cain, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945), and noted also its appearance in Ypparila v. United 
States, 219 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1954). See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. at 705. SimreZZa, 
however, marks the beginning of the principlk's general acceptance in this area of law. 
120. See, e.g., United States v. Callison, 433 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir.), vacate099 U.S. 526 
(1970); United States v. French, 429 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Purvis, 403 
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). The court in 
Owens v. United States, 396 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968), observed: 
"If the Board states reasons for its action . . . and these reasons are found to be legally 
insufficient to support the Board's classification, the classification should be found to be 
without a basis in fact. This is true even if an independent search of the record discloses an 
adequate basis in fact to support the action of the Board, for there would be the risk that the 
impropriety of the stated reasons tainted the Board's decision." Id. at 542-43. 
121. 346 U.S. 389 (1953). See note 98 & accompanying text supra. 
122. This anomaly was suggested by the court in Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 
7 16 (2d Cir. 1968): "[The] decision was not grounded in considerations of military need and 
the question before us is the validity of the decision actually rendered, not of a decision that 
might have been on other facts." 
Heinonline - -  33 Hastings L.J. 890 1981-1982 
March 19821 SELECTIVE SERVICE 89 1 
The SicureIIa rule compelled a finding of no basis in fact whenever the 
record included erroneous reasons for the board's decision, although 
other and proper bases might exist in the record. The basis-in-fact test 
had evolved to require that the record contain at least no improper 
bases. 
Use of the SicureIZa rule also suggested another problem with ap- 
plying only the basis-in-fact test: application of the test could allow a 
court to affirm board decisions based on unstated illegal grounds. If 
due process was offended by the endorsement of selective service deci- 
sions based upon illegal grounds stated by the local board,l23 it would 
also be offended by the endorsement of decisions founded upon illegal 
grounds that remained unstated. Awareness of this anomaly caused 
the courts,124 and then Congress,'" to require the Selective Service Sys- 
tem to give reasons for its classification actions. 
The Age of Reasons 
As the war in Viet Nam escalated, with corresponding increases in 
draft calls,l26 dissatisfaction with the Selective Service System's opera- 
tions In part, the rising tide of selective service prosecutions 
may have helped focus the courts' attention on the problems engen- 
dered by the basis-in-fact test.128 Beginning in 1969, a series of cases 
was decided that substantially altered this test by requiring local boards 
to state reasons for their classification decisions. 
The first of these, a Ninth Circuit decision, focused on the dill?- 
123. See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). See note 119 & accompanying text 
SUpa. 
124. See notes 129-44 & accompanying text infra. 
125. See notes 159-61 & accompanying text infra. 
126. See, eg., 302,000Men Face Draft During 1968, a 72,000 Increme, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
20, 1968, at 3, col. 6. 
127. One judge, concluding a case in which he found that the local board had acted 
arbitrarily, reflected the public's deteriorating confidence in the System. "The draft board's 
overzealous, highhanded and erroneous handling of this young man's plight hardly inspires 
confidence in the system. . . . At the very least, those entrusted with the awful power of 
conscripting the nation's young men into the armed forces in time of war or other military 
venture owe a duty of the most searching examination of the facts, scrupulous fairness, sen- 
sitive care, compassionate hearing, patient consideration, cautious action and deliberate and 
rational decision within the law. We afford no less to the worst criminal in our society." 
Walsh v. Local Bd. No. 10,305 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
128. In fiscal 1965, the year of the To& Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408,78 Stat. 
384 (1964), repealedby Pub. L. No. 91-672,s 12, 84 Stat. 2053,2055 (1971), there were 341 
Selective Service prosecutions. By 1968, there were 1,192, followed in 1970 by 2,833 and in 
1972 by 4,906. [July-December 19721 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SEMIANNUAL WORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTNE SERVICE 46. 
Heinonline - -  33 Hastings L.J. 891 1981-1982 
892 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL WoL 33 
culty presented by records without reasons. In United States v. 
N a u g h t ~ n , ~ ~ ~  the registrant's claim of conscientious objector status was 
denied. On appeal following his conviction for refusal to submit to 
induction, the court rejected Haughton's argument that Dickinson v. 
United States130 required the local board to build a record supporting 
its denial.'3l Nevertheless, the court refused to endorse denial of a 
prima facie claim absent a statement of reasons. Without such reasons, 
"a court cannot determine whether a board's denial of a requested clas- 
sification was based on a belief that the registrant's statements, even if 
true, did not entitle him to the classification, or on the reasonable dis- 
belief of certain allegations necessary to the registrant's prima facie 
case."l3* The Ninth Circuit thus brought into focus the key area of 
conflict between the Esrep basis-in-fact test and the SicureZZa line of 
cases. Particularly in conscientious objector cases, in which the critical 
issue frequently was the registrant's sincerity in making the claim,l33 
the courts were unwilling to infer from a silent record that the local 
board had properly evaluated an application and rejected it for legiti- 
mate reasons. Thus, the Dickinson approach of searching the record to 
locate a legitimate reason for the local board's decision, thereby satisfy- 
ing the basis-in-fact test, was abandoned. The courts had become 
aware of the test's substantial problems.134 
129. 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969). 
130. 346 U.S. 389 (1953). See notes 97-103 & accompanying text supra. 
131. 413 F.2d at 738. 
132. Id. at 739 (citing United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), aJ'dsu6 
nom. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)). The Ninth Circuit had rejected this rule 
in Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1966), cer?. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967). 
Haughton implicitly overruled Parrot?. 
133. See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,381-82 (1955) (upholding denial of 
conscientious objector status based on examination of facts before the board). 
134. In another sense, the Dickinson approach temporarily remained intact. If a regis- 
trant's prima facie claim for conscientious objector status was denied by a local board be- 
cause it perceived the registrant as being insincere, a search of the record would reveal no 
basis in fact absent a statement from the local board. The Sixth Circuit had recognized this 
in United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968). Wmhington recognized a dis- 
tinction between Dickimon and the typical conscientious objector case in that Dickinson's 
claim was for a ministerial exemption, "the validity of which depended on proof of certain 
objective facts with regard to the registrant's religious activities." Id. at 39. Conscientious 
objector cases, by contrast, involve an entirely subjective component: whether the local 
board believes the registrant is sincere. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381-82 
(1955). The Wmhington court thus distinguished Dickinson: "Hence, in cases where the 
claimed classification depends on objective facts, mere disbelief by the selective service au- 
thorities will not provide a basis in fact for granting a different classification. Where, how- 
ever, the veracity of the registrant is the principal issue, disbelief will suffice. But even in the 
latter situation, the record must contain some statement of this disbelief if the classification 
is to be upheld upon judicial review." United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d at 39. There- 
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Other circuits also confronted the problems raised by a denial of 
conscientious objector claims. In United States v. James,135 the Fourth 
Circuit attempted both to remain faithful to Estep's command that ju- 
dicial review be narrowly circumscribed and, following Sicurella, to re- 
quire that no unlawful reasons for the board's decision appear in the 
record. It held, therefore, that if a draft board rejected a conscientious 
objector claim because the board did not believe the registrant, that 
disbelief must be stated in the record.136 The court explained its 
concern: 
[Wle would be reluctant to sanction a decision of a local board when, 
from the record, we can only speculate that there may have been a 
basis in fact for the decision. . . . Where the local board's conclu- 
sion may be explainable upon alternate grounds, both legally accept- 
able and unacceptable, the risk is too great that we would place an 
imprimatur upon an insupportable basis of decision if we were to 
accept the government's contention.137 
Thus, the James court implicitly established a requirement that the lo- 
cal board state reasons for its disbelief.138 
The Fourth Circuit reconsidered the issues raised in James only a 
year later in United States v. B r o y l e ~ , l ~ ~  which also concerned a prima 
facie conscientious objector claim denied without a statement of rea- 
sons.140 Noting James's requirement that the local board state its h d -  
ing of insincerity,141 the court expanded that principle to require a 
statement of reasons in all conscientious objector cases: 
In any case where the board fails to disclose the basis for its decision, 
we risk blind endorsement of a mistake of law. Where it is clear that 
aprimafacie case was established, we conclude that in conscientious 
objector cases, it is essential to the validity of an order to report [for 
induction] that the board state its basis of decision and the reasons 
therefor, i.e., whether it has found the registrant incredible, or insin- 
cere, or of bad faith, and 
fore, Dickim's search-the-record approach would continue to be used, as long as the local 
board stated its disbelief. 
135. 417 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). The facts of James are, in relevant part, identical to 
those in Haughton. The registrant's conscientious objector claim was denied by the Selective 
Service System. No reasons for the denial were stated at any level. James refised induction 
and was convicted. 
136. Id. at 831; accord United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968). 
137. 417 F.2d at 831-32 (emphasis in original). 
138. "mt is not sufficient that the board merely state its disbelief in a registrant's sincer- 
ity, . . . . mhere must be a 'rational basis' for the r e h a l  of the Board to accept the validity 
of a registrant's religious claims." Id. at 832 (emphasis in original). 
139. 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc). 
140. Id. at 1300-02. 
141. Id. at 1303. 
142. Id. at 1304. In reaching its decision, the court reviewed briefly an effort made dur- 
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After Broyh, therefore, the Fourth Circuit required the Selective Serv- 
ice System to state its reasons for denying any prima facie conscien- 
tious objector claim.143 
The decisions in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits quickly found sup- 
port in other Recognizing that they could not properly re- 
view conscientious objector cases, in which there was a substantial 
subjective element,145 without knowing why the local board had acted, 
the courts declined to undertake the search of the record commended 
to them in Dickinson. Their insistence that local boards present reasons 
broadened the originally narrow scope of judicial review articulated in 
E q .  By insisting that local boards explain their actions, however, the 
courts did attempt to follow Wiimer v. United States,146 in which the 
Supreme Court warned against reviewing courts acting as super draft 
boards.147 Therefore, it is at least arguable that the evolution of the 
ing the 1967 revision of the selective service laws to require local boards to state reasons in 
co~scientious objector cases. The court noted that the effort failed, but declined to find in 
Congress' refusal an intent that there be no reasons stated. The majority suggested that 
Congress might have presumed reasons to be necessary so that judicial review procedures 
were not "empty gestures." Id. at 1306. Broy2e.r is, however, the only case to suggest this 
view of Congress' failure to act. Moreover, Congress' subsequent adoption of 50 U.S.C. app. 
5 471a(b)(4) (1976), see notes 159-61 & accompanying text infra, suggests that it made no 
- - 
such presumption. 
143. Dissenting in Broyls, Judge Bryan argued that reasons should not be required and 
should not be considered in the court's review. Instead, he contended that Witmer v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955), compelled the conclusion that a reviewing court was required to 
search the entire record for a basis in fact. United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d at 1310 
(Bryan, J., dissenting). The holding of the majority, he feared, would cast too great a burden 
upin local boards and would interfere with the efficient functioning of the selective Service 
System. Id. at 1310-1 1. Judge Bryan failed to explain, however, how the reviewing court 
could both search the record and also remain faithful to Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 
385 (1955), in any case in which reasons were stated. See notes 113-22 & accompanying text 
supra. Judge Bryan had also dissented in United States v. James, 417 F.2d 826,832 (4th Cir. 
1969). 
144. See, e.g., McAliley v. Birdsong, 451 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1971); 
United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 
472 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Lenhard, 437 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 43 1 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 
1970); United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1970); Caverly v. United States, 429 
F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1970); Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. 
Abbott, 425 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1970); Capobianco v. Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970), 
vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971). 
145. Compare Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955) (upholding denial of consci- 
entious objector status when record showed registrant's inconsistent statements) with Dickin- 
son v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953) (reversing denial of status when refusal of 
legitimately claimed exemption was based on mere suspicion and speculation). 
146. 348 U.S. 375 (1955). 
147. Id. at 380-81. See notes 105-06 & accompanying text supra. 
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statement-of-reasons rule in conscientious objector cases reflects con- 
tinued adherence by the courts to their limited scope of review.148 It is 
difficult to see how the SicureZZa rule could be observed and applied by 
reviewing courts confronted by silent records. 
The early cases concerning statements of reasons all addressed 
conscientious objector claims.149 No logical reason, however, required 
the statement-of-reasons rule to be limited to this type of deferment. 
The statement of reasons that the courts required to facilitate judicial 
review"0 would assist evaluation of any challenged classification 
decision. 
The first case to consider the possibility of expanding the rule was 
United States ex re/. Bent v. Lari.d,151 in which the registrant had 
presented a compelling argument for a hardship deferme11t.15~ After 
the initial rejection of his classification, Bent wrote to the local board, 
requesting its reasons for rejecting his ~1ai.m.l~~ The board stated no 
reasons, but forwarded his file to the appeal board, which silently af- 
finned the denial of the claim. Bent subsequently was inducted and 
petitioned for a writ of habeas c0rpus.15~ The court, reflecting the ear- 
lier cases' difficulty in dealing with opaque records, recited some of the 
possible underpinnings of the local board's decision, which, had they 
been stated, would have invalidated the induction order.l55 The Third 
Circuit recognized that "[vlery possibly the reasons for that decision 
were entirely proper and would be sustained if we knew them."156 On 
148. See United States v. Andrews, 446 F.2d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 1971). 
149. See cases cited in note 144 supra. 
150. See e.g., Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132, 1137 (3d Cir. 1970). 
151. 453 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1971). 
152. Id. at 632. Registrants who could demonstrate extreme hardship to dependents in 
the event of induction were entitled to be deferred in class 3-A. See 50 U.S.C. app. 8 456(h) 
(1976); 32 C.F.R. 8 1622.30 (1970). 
153. 453 F.2d at 628-29. 
154. Id. at 629-30. The case was more complicated procedurally. Bent was ordered for 
induction, but r e h e d  to submit. He was indicted, but thereafter agreed to submit to induc- 
tion in exchange for the government's noIIeprosequi of the indictment. Upon his induction, 
the indictment was withdrawn, and Bent challenged the local board's classification action by 
habeas corpus. Id. at 630. 
In the district court, the government argued that Bent was estopped to bring the writ 
because of his agreement to submit to induction. Although the district court concurred, 
denying the petition, id. at 626-27, the court of appeals did not. "The only thing the United 
States Attorney asked in exchange for disposing of the criminal matter was that Bent now 
comply with the order to submit to induction. He was not asked and did not agree to give 
up the right to seek judicial review of his classification by post induction habeas corpus." 
Id. at 630. Thus, the court allowed consideration of Bent's claim on the merits. 
155. I i t  632. 
156. Id. 
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the record presented on review, however, the court reversed the denial 
of the claim, extending the statement-of-reasons rule beyond conscien- 
tious objector cases.157 Thus, the court explicitly extended the state- 
ment-of-reasons rule to cases in which the registrant was astute enough 
to request them15* and implicitly extended the rule to all other defer- 
ment requests. 
The Bent court based its decision in part upon Congress' 1971 
amendments of the Military Selective Service Act.159 After much de- 
bate, Congress added to the statute a section on procedural rights,I60 
one of which was what Bent had requested of the court: "In the event 
of a decision adverse to the claims of the registrant, the local or appeal 
board making such decision shall, upon request, furnish to such regis- 
trant a brief written statement of the reasons for its decision."l61 Al- 
though the statute was enacted too late to control the decision in Bent, 
its passage assured the Third Circuit that expanding its rule requiring 
statements of reasons would not be seen as an undue burden on the 
Selective Service System.162 
157. "Because a statement of reasons is as essential for meaningful administrative and 
judicial review of the rejection of a hardship claim as for the rejection of a conscientious 
objector claim, because that requirement is no more onerous with respect to a hardship 
claim than with respect to a conscientious objector claim, and because Congress has con- 
curred in the judgment of many courts that a statement of reasons is an appropriate proce- 
dural right, we hold that at least in cases where after a hardship claim is rejected the 
registrant has requested reasons, the failure to furnish some statement of reasons invalidates 
the order to report for induction." Id. at 634. 
In Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit had 
adopted the statement-of-reasons rule for conscientious objector cases. 
158. 453 F.2d at 634. 
159. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, tit. I, 85 Stat. 348 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. $5 45 1-473 (1976)). 
160. 50 U.S.C. app. 5 471a (1976). 
161. Id. 5 471a@)(4). This provision was the subject of considerable congressional de- 
bate. Those favoring the provision had originally proposed a version that would have re- 
quired reasons to be furnished whether or not the registrant asked for them. Their 
arguments reflected an awareness of the courts' views, see notes 170-71 & accompanying text 
infra, that neither an effective administrative appeal nor significant judicial review -could be 
had without a statement of reasons. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 20,505 (1971) (remarks of 
Sen. Kennedy). This version failed to pass, however, and was replaced by 5 471a@)(4), 
requiring registrants to ask for a statement of reasons if they wanted one. Speaking in s u p  
port of that section, Senator Kennedy remarked that "the Selective Service System as it 
exists today denies fundamental rights of due process, rights traditionally protected by both 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution." 117 CONG. REC. 21,954 (1971). 
Those opposed to the provision argued that it would make the Selective Service process 
too adversarial and would impede the System's functioning. See, e.g., id. at 21,955 (remarks 
of Sen. Ervin). Whether either of these reasons should be regarded as sufficient is discussed 
at notes 195-96 & accompanying text infra. 
162. See 453 F.2d at 633. 
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Thus, twenty-five years after ~sfep ,  the scope of judicial review of 
selective service classifications seemed to be defined. The principles of 
fairness underlying SimreZZa v. United Sfafes,l63 Unr'ed States v. 
J a m e ~ , l ~ ~  and United States ex rel Bent v. Lahi165 appeared to have 
weighed more heavily than the more ephemeral considerations of non- 
interference with the selective Service System and the military reflected 
in PaZbo v. United States,166 Estq v. United States,167 and Dickinson v. 
United The emergence of the statement-of-reasons rule was 
the necessary product of the synthesis of the Estq and Sicurella doc- 
trines, because the courts could not know whether a local board had a 
proper basis in fact for its decision when the basis was not stated. Yet 
the resolution of the conflict begun in Dickinson 169 is based only upon 
practical considerations of facilitating administrative170 and judicial re- 
view.171 Moreover, because Congress enacted the statement-of-reasons I 
rule,l72 the rule is subject to repeal by subsequent legislation. Finally, 
the benefit of the statute is limited to registrants sophisticated enough 
to invoke it by requesting a statement of reasons. A more enduring 
foundation for this rule thus is necessary. 
Due Process Review of Classification Decisions 
The cases that created the statement-of-reasons rule as an adjunct 
to the basis-in-fact test did not clearly set forth the rule's justification. 
Some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Uaughtony173 
noted that registrants claiming conscientious objector status articulated 
their claims in different ways and required statements of reasons to fa- 
cilitate proper judicial review.174 Other courts stated that the rule was 
163. 348 U.S. 385 (1955). 
164. 417 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). 
165. 453 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1971). 
166. 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
167. 327 U.S. 114 (1946). 
168. 346 U.S. 389 (1953). 
169. See text accompanying notes 97-103 supra. 
170. See, eg., Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955); United States v. 
Edwards, 450 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cu. 1971). 
171. See United States ex rel. Bent v. Laird, 453 F.2d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Deere, 428 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (9th 
Ci. 1969). 
172. 50 U.S.C. app. 8 471a(b)(4) (1976). 
173. 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969). 
174. Id. at 742; accord Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis- 
senting); United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. An- 
drew~, 446 F.2d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472,482-83 
(5th Cir. 1971); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132, 1137 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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necessary to ensure meaningful appellate review within the administra- 
tive process of the Selective Service System.175 Other courts did not 
address the que~t i0n . I~~  
The court in Unired States v. A b b ~ t t ' ~ ~  gave a different explana- 
tion: "Fundamental due process requires that the defendant be entitled 
to either know or be able to infer from the file itself the basis for the 
rejection of a conscientious objector claim."178 Abbott is thus the only 
appellate decision to base the statement-of-reasons rule directly upon 
due process of law.179 The only other appellate opinion directly to re- 
fer to the due process clause in the context of the statement-of-reasons 
rule is Justice Douglas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Windor 
175. United States v. Edwards, 450 F.2d 49,52 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Speicher, 
439 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955): "Just as the 
right to a hearing means the right to a meaningful hearing, . . . so the right to file a state- 
ment before the Appeal Board includes the right to file a meaningful statement, one based 
on all the facts in the file and made with awareness of the recommendations and arguments 
to be countered." In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) and Simmons v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955), the Supreme Court required that registrants be provided with a 
resume of the F.B.I. reports given by the Department of Justice to the selective service ap- 
peal boards after investigation of conscientious objector claims. Otherwise, the Court rea- 
soned, registrants could not get fair appeals within the Selective Service System's 
administrative process. Although those cases are no longer directly applicable because the 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 abolished Department of Justice investigations, see 
note 115 supra, the principle underlying the decisions, that knowledge of the basis of a local 
board's action is essential to fair appellate review, remains. 
The court in United States v. Speicher, 439 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1971), explained how a 
statement of reasons might help the Selective Service System avoid error: "[Slince the Ap- 
peal Boards are not restricted to the scope of review delineated in [ E q ]  but may reclassify, 
they might well reject a given basis for Local Board action which a reviewing court would 
feel constrained to accept. An Appeal Board might know, for example, that a given Local 
Board, when compared with other Local Boards under its jurisdiction, consistently finds 
conscientious objector claimants to be bsincere on very little evidence. It might scrutinize 
the basis for decision from that Local Board more carefully than otherwise. It cannot do so 
when the basis for the Local Board action is unknown." Id. at 108. 
176. See, e.g., Caverly v. United States, 429 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1970); Capobianco v. 
Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 969 (1971). 
177. 425 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1970). 
178. Id. at 913 n.4; see also United States ex rel. Morton v. McBee, 310 F. Supp. 328 
(N.D. Ill. 1970); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The due 
process rationale of these cases, however, has not been explicitly followed, either at the ap- 
pellate or trial levels. 
179. In one of the leading statement-of-reasons cases, Scott v. Commanding Officer, 43 1 
F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970), Judge Aldisert explicitly stated that the rule was not constitution- 
ally based. Id. at 1138 (Aldisert, J., concurring). The court in United States v. Stetter, 445 
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 110-12 & accompanying text supra, referred to 
fairness, but did not otherwise use the language of due 
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v. United Sfates.180 The Fifth Circuit had applied the statement-of- 
reasons rule, but found the reasons stated by the local board to be suffi- 
cient. Justice Douglas declared: "A statement of reasons accompany- 
ing a decision adverse to the applicant is no less a requirement of due 
process [than a hearing on a conscientious objector clairn]."l81 
The Selective Service System should be required to state reasons 
for all classification decisions to ensure that no one is compelled to 
serve when denials of deferment requests have no lawful basis. As the 
courts recognized in developing the statement-of-reasons rule, without 
such a statement it is impossible for the courts to review properly the 
decisions of local draft boards.182 The courts often found that a local 
board's stated reasons were erroneous as a matter of law, vitiating the 
induction order under the principle of SicureZZa v. United Stafes.183 
There also may have been cases in which the local board relied in part 
on erroneous reasons, but did not in fact state any reasons. If a state- 
ment-of-reasons rule is in effect, the illegal induction orders that are the 
product of such tainted reasoning can be identified, and the registrants 
reprocessed lawfully. Without the rule, and without such a statement, 
the courts reviewing such cases will search the record for evidence sup- 
porting the local board's decision, as commanded by Edep and Diekin- 
s0n.184 They will not search for possible erroneous bases for decision. 
In a case in which a silent local board has several reasons, some valid 
and some invalid, the decision will be affirmed. The only difference 
between this case and a case under the SicureZZa principle, however, is 
the election of the local board to set forth its reasons; a registrant's 
liberty should not depend on a matter of so little substance. 
180. 419 U.S. 938 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cerf. to, 488 F.2d 1364 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
181. jd. at 939. Justice Douglas went on to explain why he felt the statement of reasons 
rule was essential for the proper functioning of the basis-in-fact test. 'Tt is a 'simple but 
fundamental rule of administrative law. . . [that if] the administrative action is to be tested 
by the basis on which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be 
understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying 
the agency's action.' " Id. at 940-41 (quoting S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 
(1947)). Thus, although the Selective Service System had been treated as a special case in 
the field of administrative law, see note 95 supra, Justice Douglas recognized the constitu- 
tional necessity of the rule. 
182. For example, in McAliley v. Birdsong, 451 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1971), the court 
explicitly observed that without a statement of reasons, the courts could not perform the 
review mandated by Esfq. Id. at 1248. This observation raises the constitutional problem, 
recognized by Justice Murphy in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 125-28 (1946) (Mur- 
phy, J., concurring), inherent in entering criminal convictions essentially without judicial 
supervision. See notes 78-125 & accompanying text supra. 
183. 348 U.S. 385 (1955). See notes 113-25 & accompanying text supra. 
184. See notes 88-103 & accompanying text supra. 
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The Military Selective Service Act requires decisionmakers in the 
Selective Service System to state reasons for decisions adverse to regis- 
trants only if requested to do so.lgS TWO problems are raised by this 
limitation. First, as a policy matter, due process ought to be available 
as a matter of course, not limited to situations in which it is requested. 
Second, registrants should not be assumed to know that they must as- 
sert their rights.186 The probable effect of providing reasons only upon 
request is to place a less sophisticated registrant at a disadvantage.lg7 
Vulnerability to induction or to criminal penalties for refusing to sub- 
mit to induction should depend upon entitlement to deferment or ex- 
emption or the lack of such entitlement, and not upon an uncounseled 
registrant's legal sophistication. 
Moreover, that due process may require decisionmakers to state 
reasons has been recognized explicitly in many other areas of law. For 
example, in Kent v. UnitedState~~18~ the defendant had been arrested in 
the District of Columbia and charged as a juvenile with housebreaking, 
robbery, and rape. The juvenile court waived its otherwise exclusive 
jurisdiction, permitting Kent to be tried and sentenced as an adult in a 
district court. The judge recited no reason for this waiver, but declared 
that it had been made after full investigation.lg9 The Supreme Court 
reversed Kent's conviction and remanded the case for reconsideration 
of whether the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction had been proper. 
The Court denounced the absence of an explanation for the waiver,lgO 
leaving no doubt about why it regards a statement of reasons as 
essential: 
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. 
It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a 
statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a 
statement of the relevant facts. It may not "assume" that there are 
ade uate reasons, nor may it merely assume that "full investigation" 
has '!I een made.lgl 
185. 50 U.S.C. 8 47 1a(b)(4) (1976). See note 161 & accompanying text mpra. 
186. The courts have recognized registrants' limitations in this respect. Eg., United 
States v. Stephens, 445 F.2d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215, 
218 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex re(. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1953); 
United States v. Marshall, 340 F. Supp. 117, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
187. See 117 CONG. REC. 20,505 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). 
188. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
189. Id. at 546. 
190. "[Tlhere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous 
consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, 
without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554. 
191. Id. at 561. Similarly, the Court has required statements of reasons to support ter- 
mination of welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970), revocations of 
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Another area in which the courts have recognized the dangers of 
unsubstantiated decisions is the setting of bail. In United Sfafes ex rer! 
Keafzhg v. Ben~inger,'~~ the defendant used a writ of habeas corpus to 
challenge a state court's denial of bail while the appeal was pending. 
The court described the inadequacy of a record without a statement of 
reasons. 
Absent any findings in support of the denial of bond, it is impossible 
to ascertain whether or not such denial was arbitrary or discrimina- 
tory. . . . reasons are not required,] the guaranty of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments agamt arbitrariness by a state court in 
the setting of bail authorized by the state legislature could be reduced 
to a nullity by the mere silence of the court denying bail. If a court 
may deny bail with no reason, hardly any set of circumstances can be 
imagined wherein it could be determined b a reviewing court that 
the denial was arbitrary or discriminatory. I& 
The logic of Kent and Bensinger has often been applied to require 
a statement of reasons in noncriminal contexts,l94 and such logic is dif- 
ficult to refute in selective service cases. The basis-in-fact standard 
cannot avoid arbitrary or irrational classification decisions if the courts 
are not told what constitutes the basis in fact. Just as in Bensinger, the 
basis-in-fact standard is repealed de facto if draft board decisions can 
be upheld even when no basis is stated. 
Conclusion 
Judicial review of draft board decisions has undergone substantial 
change since the First World War. At first, courts inquired only into 
the local board's jurisdiction; most recently, the courts asked whether 
the Selective Service System acted properly in ordering induction. The 
changes have been salutary. Judicial review must be sufficiently broad 
to ensure that due process is not a hollow concept. The records being 
reviewed must be smciently clear that the reviewing courts cannot be 
parole, Monissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,487 (1972), and revocations of probation, Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 41 1 U.S. 778,791 (1973). As in Kent, the underlying rationale for requiring a 
statement of reasons in these situations is that review is impossible when the reviewing body 
is not informed of the basis of the decision under review. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 271 (1970). 
192. 322 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ill. 1971).. 
193. Id. at 787; see also Maldonado v. Delgado, 345 F. Supp. 993, 995 (D.P.R. 1972). 
194. See, eg., Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853,862 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (denial of eligib'ity for public housing); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. 
Supp. 482, 492 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (disciplinary prison transfer); White v. G i a n ,  360 F. 
Supp. 64 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (same); Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(mental patient's transfer to ward for the criminally insane); United States v. McNeil, 434 
F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (denial of release from hospital for mental patients). 
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accused of blindly endorsing decisions made on silent records. At least, 
due process should require that the Selective Service System supply 
reasons supported by evidence to justify any decision curtailing liberty. 
Inchoate fears that the process will become too adversarial and that the 
Selective Service System will be disrupted should not be used to excuse 
a denial of due process. A process that deprives an individual of liberty 
is inherently adversarial, and there is no evidence that the Selective 
Service System will be unable to perform its function if required to 
operate within the bounds of the Constitution. In this area, as in 
others, the appearance of fairness is as important as the fact. The ap- 
pearance cannot be maintained or the fact ensured if the courts are 
forced by too narrow a scope of review to endorse decisions that may 
be based upon ignorance, misapprehension of the law, or bias. Only a 
process that allows judicial examination can avoid these traps. 
Due process at least should entitle registrants who have unsuccess- 
fully claimed deferment or exemption to h o w  why their lives are being 
put at risk and their liberty c i rc~mscr ibed .~~~  
The absence of reasons for governmental action has a long his- 
tory of abuse. The King of England used to withhold from the courts 
the reasons for detaining prisoners who sought release by habeas 
corpus. In DarneZs Case, decided in 1627, the absence of a reason for 
detention was held to justify the detention. "Mr. Attorney hath told 
you that the King hath done it, and we trust him in great matters, 
and he is bound by law, and he bids us proceed by law, as we are 
sworn to do, and so is the king; and we make no doubt but the king, 
if you seek to him, he knowing the cause why you are imprisoned, he 
will have mercy."lg6 
The return of the draft will reopen the issue of whether the Selective 
Service System must justify its classification decisions. No individual 
should be compelled to serve in the military after rejection of a claim 
for exemption or deferment if the government cannot or does not ex- 
plain the reason for the decision. 
195. As Senator Javits stated: "The draftee [should know] why he will have to accept 
the fate which is his." 117 CONG. REC. 21,956 (1971). 
196. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 59 (1980) (quoting Darnel's Case, 3 St. Tr. 2 (K. 
B. 1627)). 
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